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Abstract
Our society is increasingly beset by a range of interrelated crises - with the finan-
cial crisis, the energy crisis, and the global warming crisis as leading examples -
forming a “meta-crisis” with its roots in processes deeply entrenched in society
(Lane et al., 2011), and emanating from large-scale complex adaptive systems
so strongly interlinked that they are hard to even define and delimit. This has
made our lack of understanding of such systems simultaneously more obvious
and threatening, an issue further amplified by empirical developments brought
about by new information and communication technology. In response to this, a
substrate of semi-congruent critiques and new ideas - the former generally more
articulated than the latter - are emerging in a number of major disciplines fac-
ing similar challenges, but still without the theoretical foundation needed to align
and direct this substrate across disciplinary boundaries. The first part of the the-
sis attempts to develop such an abstraction by departing from the nature of the
large-scale complex systems, concluding that the theoretical crises are founded
in common difficulties in approaching the complexity of the systems under study,
and attempts to provide an understanding of the challenges related to these kind
of complex systems: it may be uncontroversial to suggest that the systems are
complex, but it remains unclear exactly what this entails. Based on this under-
standing, the second part aims to show how a synthesis approach to this type of
systems could look by bringing together a number of different research strands
facing challenges emanating from such systems, with the goal of forming an in-
tegrated, empirically grounded and complexity-informed perspective on change
in large-scale complex systems.
Keywords: Innovation, Complexity, Society, Transitions, Innovation Society,
Technical change, EvoDevo, Generative Entrenchment, Niche Construction The-
ory, Exaptive Bootstrapping, Wicked Systems
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Chapter1
Foreword
Those who do not move, do not notice their chains.
Rosa Luxemburg.
The secret of change is to focus all of your energy,
not on fighting the old, but on building the new.
Socrates
In my younger days - before my lust for adventure was satisfied mainly
through more academic explorations - I was at one point hitchhiking through
southern France. I ended up in a small self-sufficient anarchist village, hidden
in the lush green hills outside Alés. I was directed by a rapid stream of south-
ern French dialect (of course complete with the mandatory hand-waving) from
a group of retirees in a nearby village, to an old forest path in the hills. After
passing a stolen road sign - suspended lopsided by a rusty nail in an old pine-tree
- proclaiming that I was now leaving France, the village revealed itself in a small
verdant valley. The settlement was built on the remains of an old farming town,
whose fate had been sealed by the development of modern large-scale farming
machinery incompatible with its slanting rocky hillsides. The villagers of the old
town had left, leaving its buildings to slowly transform into ruins.
But these ruins found new inhabitants. It was settled by a motley crew of
anarchists, squatters and hippies - some of who had given up on protesting soci-
ety’s injustices from the inside and decided to instead start anew, and some who
had simply come to seek refuge among the warm welcoming community. The
hills once again grew green with vegetable gardens, and careless goats, dogs and
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poultry roamed the valley.
Their living was far from luxurious - one of the inherent downsides with self-
sufficiency. But they had some electricity from a small solar panel on a communal
shack. And their water lacked the characteristic chlorine aftertaste of the France’s
civic water supply as it poured through a makeshift pipe system straight from a
mountain spring.
After spending a few nights in the village, learning about their way of life
and how they had organized their village, I decided it was time to move on south.
After leaving the village and spending a few hours airing my thumb by a local
roundabout, I finally got picked up. It was a middle-aged businessman in a shiny
Mercedes, with his graying hair in a professionally short cut, wearing an austere
suit and the face to go with it. After a bit of polite conversation, I was invited
to his house - not an uncommon occurrence for hitchhikers, however raggedy-
looking.
The man lived alone in a large newly built house on the French Riviera, de-
signed in the functionalist concrete-and-glass style so popular among people with
refined tastes. He seemed to lead a life that was the goal and envy of many. When
it came to money and things, he was the definition of success. But sitting in his
untarnished newly remodeled kitchen, chewing a microwave-warm low-fat fish
stick, he told me - a random hitchhiker he would never meet again - about how
lost he felt. He had his own company. He lived alone in this big house. He met
people - naturally - but it was in a sense superficial and in the different roles he
had to play in work or in social life. From where he was, he didn’t know where
to strive: if even with all he had, he was not happy, what else could he do?
Something about the contrast between the rich life of the poor in the anarchist
village, and the poverty of the businessman on the French Riviera, stuck with me.
It so clearly clashed with the success stories fed to us by television and media,
telling us what constitutes a good life. Still today, having gone from unwashed
and raggedy vagrant to - well a not much less unwashed and raggedy - doctorate
student, it begs questions about our society and the narratives that we as a world
have gathered and organized around. About how quickly we buy society’s stories
about what life to lead - without reflecting on the infinity of opportunities before
us. How did we get to this?
1.1 Unsustainable at any speed
It is becoming increasingly clear that the path that we as a society tread is leading
toward the edge of a cliff - an edge set by the limits of what our nature can
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provide. Yet, for our society to change direction or leave the path has proven
difficult to say the least. A societal organization founded on continued growth -
driven by constant innovation - has spread through the world, tearing down any
trade barrier through an unending bombardment of low-priced commodities.
Fundamental in what keeps us on this destructive path seems to be our con-
sumption. Why then do we buy what we buy? If we’re honest, we all know that
the purpose of an expensive watch certainly is not to tell us the time accurately.
When we buy a watch, we buy the dream of who we could be and who we could
become. We buy a new us. Goods seem to have gone from being objects pro-
duced by people with the goal of satisfying physical needs to become something
completely different. They have become subjects, seemingly enchanted with hu-
man attributes. We buy them in the hope of finding that which we truly long after:
love, community, meaning and identity. Things we can really only get from other
people. And we buy them with the dream of becoming who we want to be. A
watch has never been advertised as merely a useful way of telling the time. It
is advertised with the beautiful women that you get wearing it, or with the suc-
cessful coveted man you would become. In the same way, a new kitchen is never
advertised as a useful place to cook food. It is advertised with a photo of happy
friends sharing a dinner. The warm sense of community you would get with that
new kitchen.
But once you’ve bought that watch or that new kitchen, you realize that you’re
still the old boring you. No new friends and no new feeling of community.
But maybe if you bought those sunglasses...
It is often said that advertisement creates false needs. This is only almost true.
Advertisement does not create needs, it takes real human needs and dislocates
them to commodities, enchanting dead artifacts with life, making you pay for the
just things that this society has taken from us - the only things you truly want -
the things that money could never buy. Without this, we would never waste our
time and energy on a new kitchen. A constant insatiable wish for new artifacts
can only be achieved by canalizing our longings for identity, love, community
and appreciation in such a way that these longings are guaranteed never to be
satisfied.
You sought friendship. You bought a kitchen. You’re disappointed.
At the same time, the communities that could actually satisfy these longings
for communion have been dismantled - torn to pieces by increasing speeds and
distances created by our technology and the individualistic ideologies that perme-
ate them. Social interaction is in our society being reduced to passing each other
in separate cars on concrete covered landscapes. We’re bowling alone (Putnam,
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2001) - but with ever newer and shinier bowling balls.
While the problems are systemic, the suggested solutions are often individ-
ualistic. Changing the world is simply a matter of not buying that new kitchen.
But no snowflake in an avalanche ever feels responsible: our manic kitchen con-
sumption is in part the manifestation of structural factors, of the dynamics of our
society.
Without your graciously provided disappointments, there would be no eco-
nomic growth. The stock market would collapse, leading to unemployment, star-
vation, chaos. There seem to be only two options: growth or collapse. So the only
realistic path is to the one we’re on. Towards collapse. There is no alternative.
The other possible venue for change, our politics - what we think of as our
society’s way of managing social change - has been reduced to the art of how to
best prime the pump of innovation. Increased innovation and growth is presented
as the only realistic solution. The only thing we can do.
At the same time, a rising number of social, ecological and economic crises
make it more and more difficult to ignore the unsustainable nature of our society.
Society’s response to these crises is - as always - to try to innovate its way
out of them, even though they were caused by innovations. Like an alcoholic
solving his hangover by a morning drink, or Slavoj Žižek’s example of the recent
innovation of chocolate flavored laxatives - the problem is presented as a cure.
This approach has indeed allowed a few rich countries to become seemingly
more sustainable, through de-industrialization and a transition toward a service-
oriented information economy. The darker, but of course necessary, type of pro-
duction - and the associated disciplined, hierarchical labor and ecological pollu-
tion - is relocated to Third World locations. The richest fractions of the popula-
tions of these rich countries can buy high-tech hybrid cars to silence that gnaw-
ing feeling of guilt. Thus, a few of the rich countries can proudly proclaim that
they have through their ingenuity managed to decouple pollution from economic
growth.
But it is becoming increasingly clear that it is not possible to innovate our-
selves out of this social and environmental crises.
The innovation solution assumes that the type of artifacts developed through
innovation cascades is controlled by social values. This is simply not the case;
they’re controlled solely by the direction of the gradient of increasing profits. The
market controls the value of an artifact and innovation follows the rationality of
markets. And this is not any old rationality. This is the rationality that says that
a corncob finds better use driving a fat man’s car a few meters than as food for a
starving child in the south. This is the rationality that says that body hair waxing
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for eight-year olds is good, while malaria pills for saving lives in the third world
is not really worth the effort.
Automation has made us enormously effective, what took many days and
workers to produce in the 19-th century can today, with the help of modern tech-
nology, be produced by a single person in the matter of just a few hours (Paulsen,
2010). This has freed enormous amounts of human time. But as society can only
function if we continue working, we still have to labor and produce during the
time we’ve won. Produce more and build more artifacts. Innovate, innovate, in-
novate. And we could indeed find plenty of good use for these added artifacts:
the needs of human kind are enormous - a large part of the global population
is without food, housing and medicine, and our ecosystems are collapsing. Our
enormous productivity could easily provide for the basic needs of the world’s
population while at the same time stabilizing a failing environment.
But feeding the poor just is not a good business model. A better model is
to find what new needs can be created for the people that already have food,
shelter and medicine, in addition to two plasma TVs. Sustainability or ethical
consideration has little to do with what is produced.
That this is the case has nothing to do with innovators and entrepreneurs being
naturally evil or unethical. There are of course many innovators driven solely by
socially and ethically concerns - the point is that that does not matter in a system
which is built on value rather than values. A businessman who tries to produce
food for the poor is not a long-lived businessman. However, a businessman who
explains to you that your loneliness is in fact caused by natural body odors, which
happens to be easily solved through his new super-effective and only slightly
carcinogen aluminum deodorant, is significantly more likely to achieve longevity.
Profit - not human needs - is the overarching purpose of production. And the
overlap between profit and human needs is, shall we say, exaggerated.
This can also be clearly seen in what products are actually produced for the
rich minority that has the benefit of constituting the profitable market. These
artifacts are shaped according to profit maximization, which, as opposed to what
we often think, has little to do with efficiency or utility. Instead, it more often
means optimizing the pace of their obsolescence. This can be seen in the research
that has been spent trying to find materials that break after a specified amount of
use. It can also be seen in fashion, the social mechanism that makes your perfectly
well functioning clothes suddenly seem aged and obsolescent. It can be seen in
potato peel-styled potato peelers, designed with the sole purpose of maximizing
the chance that you accidentally throw the peeler out with the waste. From a
profit perspective, these things are perfectly rational - companies naturally need
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to increase their profits. From any other perspective, it is an unsustainable waste
of resources in a world where the scarcity of these resources is becoming more
and more acute.
But this twisted form of rationality has become so natural to us that its true
nature is difficult to perceive. The economic system is not only a way of organiz-
ing production and consumption of goods, it goes much deeper: it shapes people,
as well as relations between people. It controls who produces what for whom. It
even changes what we value and how we look at the world; what we think is pos-
sible and what is not. It tells us that changing our economic system is naïve and
unrealistic, but that infinite growth on finite resources is possible and realistic.
It tells us that air pollution, dwindling fresh water reserves, human and nuclear
waste, destruction of rain forests and biological diversity, scarcity of natural re-
sources, global heating and so on, is no cause for alarm - it is not like we can
change anything and surely there is some expert taking care of all that. It tells us
that it is not a big problem that we are using resources far beyond what our world
can provide.
The strongest public argument for the continuation of this system is simple:
there is no alternative. But this notion needs to be challenged. While fundamen-
tal change in societal systems, what some call a Great Transition (Raskin et al.,
2002), is difficult to imagine - as we can only see the world in which we live - it is
by no means historically rare. Things that have been considered unthinkable and
unrealistic have only a few years later been seen as natural and unquestionable.
Social and technological change has proven to be as rapid as it is unpredictable.
Even in our lifetimes, new technologies have transformed the way we live; cell-
phones, Facebook and the Internet have changed the way we organize our social
life. But such fundamental changes have thus far only been organized toward
what grants increasing profits to their instigators. But there is not intrinsic reason
for this. Perhaps such change can be directed, scaffolded, and shaped into more
beneficial forms.
But the ideas of how to achieve societal change are themselves locked-in;
they are affected by the same dynamics as society itself - by the same reification
as much as any other commodity in post-modernist capitalism; co-opted into a
fashion attires, profaning all that is holy - as Che Guevara’s face looks down from
a catwalk t-shirt. When ideas become commodities, they open to gentrification
- transformation by the influence of the affluent. Everything may be political,
but anything solid melts into air. Ideas of societal change have been left to poets
and rebelling teenagers, whose ideas - while often creative and inspirational -
have a limited foundation in scientifically founded understanding of how society
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functions. But even the traditional social sciences have few answers to give: the
left-right dichotomy in politics recollects the agent-structure dichotomy of social
science. But one thing is clear: new models of change - outside of traditional ones
presented by either the left or right - are needed. And today, our understanding of
society may be reaching the point where an intellectual debate on the construction
of such models may become possible. A world where the recipes for tomorrow’s
soup kitchens can at least be discussed. A foundation for ideas of another world.
Chapter2
Introduction
Increasing inequality (e.g. Piketty, 2014; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010), climate
change (e.g. Stocker et al., 2013), eco-system collapse (e.g. MEA, 2005), eco-
nomic and social instability (e.g. Colander et al., 2009; Headey, 2011; Helbing,
2013; Tainter, 1990); the evidence pointing to the unsustainability of our soci-
ety is mounting. Many of these problems facing us - scientifically and as citi-
zens - emanate from large-scale complex adaptive systems such as societies and
ecosystems. These systems are not only complex in themselves, but are often in-
terlinked so strongly and in such bewildering ways that they can be hard to even
define and delimit. As the crises become increasingly more pressing, our short-
comings when it comes to understanding and controlling the systems generating
them grow more apparent and troublesome.
This range of interrelated crises, or “meta-crisis” (Lane, 2011), has made our
lack of understanding society and the global environment simultaneously more
obvious and threatening. Social science is coming under increasing pressure, not
only from this mounting scale and frequency of interacting societal and environ-
mental crises, but also from empirical developments brought about by new infor-
mation and communication technology. Old theory, thought of as safe ground, is
being undermined by an explosion of new data and methods for analysis, as the
societal system itself is simultaneously becoming more and more complex: more
interconnected, less predictable and stable, as well as more and more energy-
and material intensive, with a stronger effect on ecology and climate as a result.
This is unveiling deep-rooted problems when it comes to the traditional scientific
approach we have taken to these types of systems.
In response to such issues, a substrate of semi-congruent critiques and new
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9ideas are emerging in a number of major disciplines facing similar challenges -
although the problems is still significantly more articulated than the solutions.
While such alternative perspectives and methods are developing, they still lack
much of a theoretical foundation: there is clearly a need to align and direct this
substrate on an abstract level to reach across disciplinary boundaries.
The first part of this thesis attempts to develop such an abstraction by de-
parting from the nature of the large-scale complex systems that is the focus of
these disciplines, illustrating how such systems entail certain methodological
challenges, linking the efforts pursued in a range of disciplines. In many ways,
the theoretical crises in various disciplines are related to common difficulties in
approaching the complexity of the systems under study, and attempts to provide
a basis for an understanding of the challenges confronting any science working
with this type of large-scale complex systems. While it is uncontroversial to sug-
gest that the systems are complex, it remains unclear exactly what implications
this entails.
Based on the understanding of the common challenges at hand, the second
part aims to show an example of such a synthesis between a range of ideas for
approaching this type of systems. This approach consists of the beginning of a
synthetic perspective on change in this type of complex adaptive systems, bring-
ing together a number of different research strands facing similar methodological
and ontological challenges emanating from such systems. The goal is to bring to-
gether and align a range of ideas that are beginning to develop in a range of disci-
plines, to form a more integrated, empirically grounded and complexity-informed
perspective.
Chapter3
Complexity and Society
Panta cwrei, oudei menei. (Everything flows and nothing stays.)
Heraclitus
Fritzgerald: “The rich are different from us.”
Hemingway: “Yes, they have more money.”
Let us start at the beginning: what kind of system are we dealing with here?
There is a broad consensus that society is complex, but what does it mean that a
system is complex?
A glance at the history of complexity science may tell us something about the
meaning of the term complexity, and how this rather tacit meaning has emerged.
From early on, the Santa Fe Institute (SFI) came to function as a powerful actor
in uniting and aligning what can today be referred to as complexity science. The
SFI was the first dedicated research center for complexity science, founded in
Santa Fe, New Mexico in 1984, by a group of highly influential scientists, many
of which were active at the nearby Los Alamos National Laboratory, with roots
in the Manhattan Project, and thereby also in the origins of scientific computing
and dynamical systems theory in general (see e.g Galison, 1997). While many
important ideas about complexity are of course older than the SFI, the institute
came to bring together a range of ideas and methods under the common flag
of complexity science, and thereby in practice also suggesting a meaning of the
concept of complexity as understood by scientists, policymakers and the public.1
1This type of social process, rather than as one may think just through a scientific basis in
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Individual traditions and scientists may be more or less strongly aligned with this
mainstream, but anyone claiming to work with “complex systems” must relate to
it in one way or the other.
While the SFI is an explicitly multidisciplinary center, it is much less method-
ologically diversified, focusing on formal, quantitative methods, close to natural
science and quantitative social science. At the heart of this methodology lie com-
puter simulation, which crucially brings the capability to describe the entities
and interaction rules of dynamical systems so as to put it all “into motion”. The
typical model in this tradition has a microlevel of interacting nodes existing in a
pre-defined environment. Setting up the rules and the environment, the system
is allowed to play out, and the results and patterns that emerge from the often
long chains of interaction are studied. This is an highly flexible methodology
that made it possible to study and visualize dynamics that are inaccessible to the
unaided human mind, thus making possible a systematic inquiry into emergence
in dynamical systems.
This characterization of complex systems comes naturally through the method
of simulation, but has also become a way of defining complexity. It has ar-
guably gone from simply being a methodology to attaining an ontological sta-
tus. This can be seen in the characterizations of complexity that can be found in
the literature. Johnson (2009) defines complexity as “the study of the phenom-
ena which emerge from a simple collection of interacting objects”. Similarly,
Mitchell (2009) describes a complex system as “a system in which large net-
works of components with no central control and simple rules of operation give
rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated information processing, and
adaptation via learning and evolution”. Holland (2006) agrees, but is almost even
more restrictive by stating that complex systems “are systems that have a large
numbers of components, often called agents, that interact and adapt or learn.”
There is very much in line with Joshua Epstein’s understanding of complexity
(see e.g. Epstein, 1996), as something that grows from the bottom-up.
All these are different descriptions of the emergence of a macro structure
from the interaction of micro entities; a specific type of emergence that we may
refer to as micro-emergence: lower level entities interact in such a way as to
generate a higher level that we cannot intuitively anticipate even if we understand
completely the behavior of the lower level entities. When a higher level has
emerged, it can in turn function as the micro of a second level in a multi-level
system where each level can be successfully studied in isolation. This is clearly
objective theoretical demarcations, is of course how disciplines tend to develop; one “cannot [...]
artificially separate the[...] substantive content from [...] social behaviour” (Price, 1970)
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a central type of dynamics in a wide range of systems - and it has wide-ranging
methodological and epistemological implications.
Emergence here can be characterized as a certain type of mass dynamics: the
interaction of a multitude of entities generates an aggregated result that we are
cognitively simply not equipped to handle. The chains of causation are simply
too long and interwined for us to be able to grasp them, as our cognitive abilities
evolved for an environment where these systems were neither as ubiquitous nor
as important. We therefore need external tools, such as computer simulations,
to bridge this cognitive gap and integrate the understanding into our theories of
social systems.
The nature of this type of systems is often explained by complexity scien-
tists through a fundamental distinction between complexity and complicatedness
(also referred to as dynamical and structural complexity; see e.g. Érdi (2007)).
These two system qualities are often juxtaposed and contrasted for the purpose
of explaining what complexity science is really about (e.g. in Cilliers, 1998). A
Google search for “complex vs complicated” yields a wealth of examples, and
the nature of these demonstrates that this is a distinction that is perceived of as
consequential and of practical relevance. The distinction is really used for ex-
plaining what complexity is by specifying something that it is not, namely com-
plicatedness. So complexity, then, would roughly be what we intuitively think
of as complexity, but minus complicatedness. That may not go a long way as a
formal definition of complexity, or even as an intelligent discussion about what
complexity can be argued to be, but we think it does say something about the
practice of complexity science.
When opposed in this way, complicatedness is associated with top-down or-
ganization, such as a spaceship or a computer, while complexity is associated
with bottom-up self-organization - like a flock of birds or a panicking crowd.
While we can study the first type of systems through disassembly - reducing the
spaceship into its nuts and bolts and analyzing its structure - this does not work
well with systems of the latter type: studying the behavior of a single bird in iso-
lation will tell us little of the emergence of the organization of a flock of birds.
We cannot understand complex systems through the traditional scientific method
of studying the parts; the behavior of the flock comes from the interactions of its
components - the magic is in the relations.
Although complexity and complicatedness are clearly linked in numerous
ways - both types of systems consist of clearly separable underlying entities -
they still present us with two radically different sets of methodological and theo-
retical challenges. The fundamental change in perspective suggested by complex-
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ity science has proven highly effective in approaching a wide range of systems
that have previously been difficult to handle: from flocks of birds and beehives
to traffic congestion and crowd behavior (Helbing et al., 2005; Reynolds, 1987;
Teodorovic et al., 2011). This micro-emergentist approach to complexity has
been highly successful in providing new concepts and tools for dealing with a
wide range of different systems.
So what about societal systems in this? Are they complex or complicated - are
they more like a spaceship or more like a flock of birds? On the one hand, they are
undeniably complicated with their array of qualitatively different and interacting
entities in a multi-level organization, which is what for example systems theories
seize upon in their descriptions of societal systems. Yet society is also often,
and quite convincingly, argued to be a complex system in the bottom-up self-
organization sense, and much of its complicated structure arises from bottom-up
rather than top-down processes (e.g. Ball, 2012; Castellani and Hafferty, 2009;
Sawyer, 2005). The story is very similar for ecosystems. We clearly see no reason
why systems could not be both complicated and complex at the same time, both
society and ecosystems seem to constitute excellent examples of such systems.
As things stand, the mainstream of complexity science may be aware that
complexity and complicatedness are distinct qualities, but complicatedness in
complex systems is not seen as a fundamental problem. Complicated or not,
they are complex, and that is what is seen as fundamentally important: extend-
ing mainstream complexity science to deal with them is seen as challenging, but
gradual and cumulative work, often by going from simple models to more and
more “realistic” ones.
In Paper I, we develop an opposing perspective, arguing that adding compli-
catedness to complex systems in fact does not only mean a quantitative differ-
ence, and that, consequently, adding more of the same methods used to study
complex systems will not be enough. Instead, complexity and complicatedness
interact, forming an emergent third category of systems, qualitatively different
both from complex and complicated systems. This third type of system is referred
to as wicked systems, in reference to Churchman (1967) concept of wicked prob-
lems. Wicked systems are not a type of complex systems, but a type of system
where complexity is mixed with complicatedness, yielding an emergent quality -
wickedness - to which neither complexity science, systems approaches, analytical
models or combinations between them lend themselves very well. In other words,
society is not a complex system, at least not in the mainstream micro-emergent
sense.
Attempts at ignoring the complicatedness of society, regarding it solely as
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Figure 3.1: A conceptual graph illustrating the relation between complex, complicated
and wicked, as well as some example systems and properties. The diagram also serves to
provide a metaphor: in the same way as the blue and yellow color in the diagram blend
to create green, complexity and complicatedness mix - creating something qualitatively
different.
the same type of complex system as a flock of birds, rather quickly runs into
problems. One issue that this perspective on complexity faces is that the micro
entities - i.e. humans - themselves are highly complex systems, with both individ-
ual agency and the ability to instill agency into collective organizations. Social
movements, professions and NGO’s are all examples of macro entities that in turn
have agency and that can interact both with each other and with underlying ele-
ments. Humans have the cognitive ability to interpret and describe structures, and
to internally form ontologies and narratives based on an interaction with reality,
and act upon those constructions. The same thing goes for collective organiza-
tions. This means that there is a presence of other types of causation than the
micro-micro interaction present in micro-emergent systems: top-down causation,
horizontal causation, and causation in all kinds of directions are fundamental to
social systems. Such interaction in turn leads to a range of types of emergence
that cannot be described as a micro-emergence. This is the complicatedness of
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society in action. While micro-emergence of course can be constitutive of higher
order entities, higher order entities can also be the emergent product of inter-
actions at their own levels or across levels. In other words, society is certainly
complex, but it is also structurally complicated: it has a complicated set of emer-
gent levels interacting in complex ways. The question is to what extent this poses
a problem for the application of complexity theory on societal systems.
3.1 Poor Decomposability - Ontological Uncertainty and Chaos
We touched briefly on the existence of important similarities between compli-
cated and complex systems, which turn out to be central to showing what dis-
tinguishes wicked systems from both. A crucial similarity is that they are both
structured into a nested hierarchies, with each level forming the building blocks
for the next: this is what allows the systems to be reduced downward into distin-
guishable subsystems (Simon, 1962). With wicked systems, we are not as fortu-
nate; while they are far from homogeneous, they are in general not decomposable
into stable subsystems.
A fundamental difference between complex and complicated systems is the
mode of reduction: complicated systems are structured in such a manner that
reduction can be done relatively easily, putting the focus primarily on the at-
tributes of the components of the underlying level, while in complex systems
the reduction are much less ordered - requiring a more relational focus. Due to
the multitude of relations and interactions, complex systems have mass dynam-
ics that are impossible to predict in detail. While this is an important difference,
the similarity, that both approximate a nested hierarchical system structure, has
profound implications: at each new level we can reduce both complexity and
complicatedness back down to manageable levels again, and this is what allows
us to construct systems that, taken as wholes, are mindbogglingly complicated;
in engineering as well as in biological development. The parts of such a system
can be improved independently, with respect to identifiable functions, as long as
those functions are retained. For example, it is straightforward to replace the en-
gine of a car with another engine with the same function, but, say, an improved
fuel economy. In fact you can do anything to a component as long as you do not
alter its interface (see e.g. “sandwiched emergence”: Lane 2006; Villani et al.
2014; and “generative entrenchment”: Wimsatt 2001).
That both complicated and complex systems are organized into nested hier-
archies is no accident. This similarity stems from a shared developmental history
of the systems: they are both in some ways selected for top-level functionality.
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Selection for top-level functionality often yields hierarchical systems with near-
decomposable levels (such as engineered artifacts or organisms) since such an
organization increases evolutionary adaptability (Simon, 2002; Wimsatt, 1974).
Hierarchical systems are simply more evolutionarily flexible: by recombining the
elements and interactions of a level, a new higher-level entity can be formed.
Wicked systems do not share this developmental history, as they are generally
not adaptive or lack pressure for top-level functionality. This implies that the con-
stituents of wicked systems constantly try to outsmart one-another, reaping their
own benefits, reacting to threats from other constituents. They constantly enter
into new constellations, dissolve old constellations, and react to the immediate
situation around them. What we get is a situation where complicated organiza-
tion and complex dynamics is in a constant state of re-negotiation, constantly
challenging any settlement of the system into a level hierarchy, constantly facing
the system with qualitative novelty that other components have to react to.
Figure 3.2: A near-decomposable system, conceptually illustrated in two ways. Because
of time scale separation, the outer environment can be regarded as static, and the inner
can be similarly disregarded.
Figure 3.3: A poorly decomposable system. Because of lack of clear system demar-
cations and time scale separation, it can be unclear what outer and inner environment
would even mean.
Organization into nested hierarchies also brings with it the possibility to study
the systems formally “in the short run” (Simon, 1962). The meaning of short run
here is a time scale is long enough for interesting dynamics to occur, but short
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enough for the assumptions about the interfaces to remain valid. Each organi-
zational level brings with it some separation of time scales, implying that the
ontology of the system level will be relatively fixed. The greater the separation
of scales between the internal and the external environment, the greater will the
difference in size and speed of the dynamics on these two levels be, and the more
generous will the short run be; i.e. the more interesting things will have time
to happen. Fixed ontologies allow one to specify meaningful quantitative mea-
sures from which to study the system; without such measures, only qualitative
descriptions of transforming ontologies remain. This is where we are forced to
operate when working with wicked systems, as they will continuously change in
a qualitative way, falsifying model assumptions as soon as they are made.
This type of change is exceptionally difficult to study, even compared to com-
plex and chaotic systems. For example, weather systems, while infamous for
their unpredictability, are only quantitatively chaotic: on the relevant time-scale
for weather prediction, they are ontologically fixed. The weather systems can
take any from a finite set of forms and the chaos is only in relation to the degree
of precision which is required in order to specify which form will exist at a point
in time in the future (Byrne and Callaghan, 2013).
Clearly, however, there are many important cases where we can surely make
assumptions of near-decomposability also in wicked systems, and where we thus
are able to bring powerful scientific approaches to bear. For the purposes of
complexity science it would seem reasonable that certain subsystems - such as
crowd behavior, protein-folding, or the ceteris paribus fate of a new trait in a
population - can be argued to fit this description. The dynamics of cars and
people play themselves out over much shorter time scales than that on which
urban systems, roads, traffic regulation and so on, change. Such phenomena are
also often ephemeral, which bounds the problem even further. For example, at
night the traffic jam dissipates and leaves no traces that affect tomorrow’s traffic.
But what about evolutionary societal and ecological phenomena more in gen-
eral? For example, what about sociotechnical transitions, evolutionary radiation
events, or other wicked problems? Wicked systems in general are open systems,
in which many and far-flung types of processes co-exist, co-evolve and have an
impact on each other on overlapping timescales and levels of organization. They
involve discontinuous, qualitative change as well as cascade effects (e.g. Lane,
2011) whereby change strongly and rapidly feeds back into the conditions for
further change. Such systems are, to say the least, hard to contain in a Simonean
compartment with a “short run” over which, for example, transitions can be stud-
ied against the background of an unchanging external environment. The funda-
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mental problem for complexity science in this context, and really any approach
that relies on these ontological assumptions, is that there is no way of cutting
wicked systems into distinct and persistent levels of organization.
Put in another way, the type of hierarchy that micro-emergence assumes does
matter in wicked systems, but neither causality nor structure is restricted to the
hierarchies: we have interpenetration and overlaps, as well as multi-directional
causality. Simon (1962) was of course aware of the existence of such interpen-
etrations. Nevertheless, he assumed that there was enough hierarchical structure
to make modeling possible, and thus emphasized that which falls within the hier-
archies, posing that hierarchical models provide an adequate approximation. In
complex and complicated systems, such interpenetrations are indeed exceptions,
but in wicked systems, they are the norm.
Wicked systems are in a constant state of flux, with only temporary stability,
resulting from the interplay of a variety of counteracting forces - a boiling pot of
change where each shape and structure seems to evolve as quickly as it dissolves.
Discernible structures appear and some may be highly persistent while other are
as quick to vanish again. Gradual quantitative change, where the entities func-
tionalities or interactions slowly evolve, is ubiquitous, but it gradually lays the
foundation for more fundamental transitions to occur: rapid qualitative change,
where the very nature of the entity itself gets transformed - quantitative change
becomes qualitative (Carneiro, 2000). Its demarcation lines and defining features
dissolve, implying constant transformation and what Lane and Maxfield (2005)
refer to as ontological uncertainty.
While this characterization of wicked systems might be new from a complex
system point of view, it is far older as a description of society. This description is
in fact similar to how society has been described by some social scientific authors
going back to Heraclitus, 500 years BCE. It has since been repeated and devel-
oped by a range of authors, such as Goethe (in his critic of the Gestalt concept:
“we will discover that nothing in them is permanent, nothing is at rest or defined
- everything is in a flux of continual motion”, Goethe 1807). Marx and Engels’
materialist dialectics, of course building - and ’turning on its head’ - Hegalian
dialectics, was based on similar foundations (Engels, 1877, 1954). Ideas further
developed in Bhaskar’s critical realism (Bhaskar, 2013a,b), into which other au-
thors added a complexity-informed understanding (see e.g. Byrne and Callaghan,
2013; Castellani and Hafferty, 2009; Cilliers, 2005). These perspectives have
much in common with an understanding of wicked systems.
More broadly speaking, the wicked perspective relates in many ways to post-
modern theory, which represents a major vehicle for critique against the potential
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of formal approaches to deal with precisely what we describe as wicked systems
(Cilliers, 1998). While the critical perspective of postmodernist theory is well-
developed, the constructive suggestions for alternative approaches are much less
so. Rather than aiming to provide a different objective analysis, it has focused on
critiquing the very idea of pursuing objective analysis, with the result of being
widely seen as unconstructive. Postmodernism is very widely represented in the
social sciences and humanities, and although it is somewhat waning today, what
we refer to as qualitative social science is permeated by its science critique, its
analysis in terms of political power relations, and in general its distrust against
the idea of an objective social science that tells us how to run the world.
The result is, besides being widely seen as unconstructive, that it is even
worse equipped for dealing with this new profusion of data than the theory that
it criticizes. This does not mean that theory in this broad category has nothing
to offer, but it does mean that, as it stands, it does not emerge as a contender for
building something new. Our analysis is influenced by postmodern ideas, but it
is also in reaction against the failure of postmodern critique to be constructive.
Assumptions of decomposability are so deeply embedded in our scientific
work that wicked systems have not only methodological implications, but im-
plications for the philosophical foundations of science itself. Leaning somewhat
on the social scientific literature described above, we will now explore some of
the implications for how to scientifically approach societal systems (the focus
here is on societal systems, but to certain degree applies more broadly to wicked
systems.)
3.2 Boundaries of Knowledge
What we have thus far discussed about wicked systems is that they are under
constant qualitative change and ontological uncertainty (Lane, 2011). This relates
to another of the central characteristics of systems with poor decomposability:
that specifying their boundaries is highly difficult. While decomposable systems
generally have clear defined boundaries, and in turn consist of distinguishable
entities - the birds in a bird flock might interact in complex ways, but at least they
can be distinguished as separate entities - but this is often not the case in wicked
systems. As Cilliers (2001) puts it, what we call wicked systems
have structure, embodied in the patterns of interactions between
the components. Some of these structures can be stable and long
lived [...], whilst others can be volatile and ephemeral. These struc-
tures are also intertwined in a complex way. We find structure on all
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scales. [...] [N]on-contiguous sub-systems could be part of many dif-
ferent systems simultaneously. This would mean that different sys-
tems interpenetrate each other, that they share internal organs. How
does one talk of the boundary of the system under these conditions?
(Cilliers, 2001)
Furthermore, since ideas of spatial continuity do not apply to these systems,
one of the foundations on which we traditionally base the notion of boundaries is
turned on its head. As Cilliers puts it:
We often fall into the trap of thinking of a boundary as something
that separates one thing from another. We should rather think of a
boundary as something that constitutes that which is bounded. This
shift will help us to see the boundary as something enabling, rather
than as confining. [...] [An] implication of letting go of a spatial
understanding of boundaries would be that in a critically organised
system we are never far away from the boundary. If the components
of the system are richly interconnected, there will always be a short
route from any component to the “outside” of the system. There is
thus no safe “inside” of the system, the boundary is folded in, or per-
haps, the system consists of boundaries only. Everything is always
interacting and interfacing with others and with the environment; the
notions of “inside” and “outside” are never simple or uncontested.
(Cilliers, 2001)
So not only are wicked systems under constant ongoing ontological change,
but their boundaries are also far from as clear as positivist science must imag-
ine them. In wicked systems, entity interaction - on and between all levels - is
ubiquitous and central to the dynamics of the system. But since there are also
relations with the surrounding environment, it is generally not obvious where the
boundaries are to be drawn. It is more of a question of framing: we frame the
system by describing it, but reality constrains where the frame can be drawn (Cil-
liers, 1998, 2001). The boundary is neither only a construction nor only a natural
thing - it is a mix and an ongoing interaction between these.
This clearly has implications for how to approach wicked systems scientif-
ically. While complex systems require radically new scientific methodologies
to deal with the intricacies of relational reduction, the poor decomposability of
wicked systems calls for something far more radical still - a fundamentally differ-
ent epistemological and ontological perspective (Castellani and Hafferty, 2009).
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The constant ontological transformation clearly implies a weaker type of knowl-
edge claims, and Cilliers (2001) accordingly suggests a significantly less univer-
sal conception of scientific knowledge: as contextual, local and specific in time
and space. This may sound postmodernist, but there is a significant difference
between this and full-blown relativism. That the possibilities for prediction and
description are limited does not mean that anything goes, as the most radical post-
modernist theorists may put it; the world can be known, even if that knowledge
is contextual and time limited. While this has implications for positivism, it in no
way downplays the importance of scientific work. Quite the opposite: that our
knowledge of a system is only local and temporary emphasizes the importance of
knowing how to learn about a system (Byrne and Callaghan, 2013). It however
affects how to scientifically relate to the systems under study, as Actor-Network
theorist John Law (2004) puts it: “... [I]n this way of thinking the world is not
a structure, something that we can map without social science charts. We might
think of it instead, as a maelstrom or a tide rip”.
But our scientific knowledge will not only be contextual and time-limited:
because of the constant ontological transformation we have no stable ground to
stand on required for a reduction of the system; if we are to be sure that the
dynamics of the system is the same, we cannot represent a complex system with
anything less complicated than itself (Cilliers, 2001). Since simplifications are
of course necessary for any meaningful scientific work, this basically means that
any representation will necessarily be flawed, and we cannot even know in which
way it is flawed. Because of the unclear boundaries, we have to choose a framing
- but picking a framing will always involves normative issues: we decide how
and what to include and what to leave out.
To make this choice worse, we will necessarily affect the reality of the system
through our choice in framing (Cilliers, 2000). Constructing a however arbitrary
boundary for a system can mean that this boundary becomes more present in
the system; temporary structures may gain longevity by being described. While
charting the maelstrom of constant change, we sometimes help to produce mo-
mentary stability, as there is a form of continuous co-evolution between theories
about systems and their reality (Law, 2004). Reality speaks to theory, but theory
also speaks to reality as descriptions affect what is described. The act of generat-
ing the knowledge may affect the system under study, for example through what
Merton (1968) called a self-fulfilling prophecy (think for example of Moore’s
law). As Law (2004) puts it, “[r]eality [...] is not independent of the apparatuses
that produce reports of reality”. This is also one of the main takeaways from
Actor Network Theory (Latour, 1987).
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That we affect society by studying it can actually be illustrated by the devel-
opment of the postmodernist theory itself. The postmodernist crisis in knowl-
edge was not caused by theory alone, but is a response to real changes in society.
Again, reality has a voice in the formation of theory; it is the complexity of post-
modern society that has generated the crisis of knowledge - but these changes in
theory have also had important implications for that same reality. Again, the two
interact and co-evolve.
The conclusion that studying a system implies making changes to it, in com-
bination with Cilliers’s notion that what we call wicked systems always have to
be seen from a chosen frame of reference, results in serious ethical implications
for the study of wicked systems. In formal models, this may be concealed be-
hind computational or mathematical forms of representation, hiding the norma-
tive decisions of framing by enciphering the assumptions and normative choices
in technical code (Feenberg, 1991). As Byrne and Callaghan (2013) note, there
is a clear tendency for such ostensible neutrality of scientific work to serve what
Gramsci called the hegemony.
An alternative proposed by several of these authors is a more explicit and
active engagement with the system under study. Indeed, Cilliers (1998) focused
strongly on the ethical implications of complexity theory and based on this argued
that it was even unethical to engage with societal systems from the outside. He is
not alone in these considerations. Gerrits (2012) argues in the context of policy
interventions that it is necessary to engage with the actors who are part of the
situation and take account of their respective narratives: in other words, as scien-
tists, we need to embed ourselves in the processes, if we are to fully understand
them.
For both Cilliers and Gerrits, active engagement becomes part of the process
of science itself. Byrne and Callaghan (2013) go further: “good social knowledge
of complex social systems is based on co-production between social scientists and
the human agents in the field of investigation”, arguing that this takes us beyond
dialogue and into the realm of action - we should not only take part, but also take
sides and take action. This is clearly an argument for action research, associated
to a rather large strand of literature (e.g. Argyris et al., 1985; Byrne, 2011; Whyte,
1991).
While this argument may - perhaps righty - be seen as taking it too far, it
clearly emphasizes a radically different approach to science than that which has
traditionally been employed in complexity theory, and provides solid arguments
that dealing with wicked systems requires us to stay close to the narratives and
actors involved. This is certainly part of the success of the narrative approach
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to qualitative science: the flexibility of narratives allow a close proximity to re-
ality, the stories and actors involved. Methods and perspective developed in an
approach to wicked systems will need to show similar strengths.
3.3 Scientific Disciplines and Poorly Decomposable Systems
Assumptions based on decomposability are not only part of our scientific method-
ologies, but also of how our scientific work is organized. Such assumptions un-
derlie the subdivision of scientific work into disciplines, into specific careers, into
smaller and smaller parts. This approach relies on assumptions of decomposabil-
ity of the system under study that, as we have seen, simply do not hold for wicked
systems.
Wicked systems are not necessarily possible to separate into weakly interac-
tive wholes. There is not necessarily any meaningful way of “carving nature at
its joints”: interactions go in all directions and there is little stable ground on
which to build theory. Chewing off manageably sized pieces might in fact very
well render the relevant dynamics inaccessible to study.
This implies a more integrated and synthetic science. It points to increased
interdisciplinarity on all levels of scientific organization: from the education of
the single researcher, to the organizational structure of universities. This is very
much in line with the suggestions for a breakdown of the disciplinary boundaries
made by the Gulbenkian Commission (1996) on the Future of the Social Sciences.
It is of course not a new insight, but is certainly given more formal credence
through an understanding of wicked systems.
3.4 Conclusion
While it is uncontroversial to claim that society is complex, what this actually
means has remained somewhat unclear. Approaching society, the assumption
from mainstream complexity science has been that societal complexity is essen-
tially similar to the complexity of the kind of systems with which it has shown
great success, such as flocks of birds. The undeniable structural complicatedness
of society has been seen as merely a complicating factor: the only thing missing
in the attempts to understand society is more effort and funding. This has not only
been the foundation for the way that society has been approached methodologi-
cally, but also scientifically, as it has been seen as a green light for the application
of the same type of positivist formal methods that have proven successful in the
application on complex and complicated system.
24 CHAPTER 3. COMPLEXITY AND SOCIETY
However, the realization that complicatedness mixed with complexity forms
an emergent new type of system - breaking the fundamental assumption of near-
decomposability - has undermined the not only methodological, but also episte-
mological and ontological approach of both traditional and complexity-informed
science. We have concluded that wicked systems are in many ways fundamen-
tally different from both complex and complicated systems: (i) They are under
constant ontological transformation: there can in general not be assumed that the
underlying ontology is fixed; change is constantly both quantitative and quali-
tative. (ii) They are open and have unclear system boundaries. (iii) They are
irreducible: as the ontology is under constant transformation, the system and its
dynamics cannot be credibly simplified and reduced. The system itself is its own
smallest fully accurate model.
We have furthermore concluded that this insight has important effects on how
to do scientific work. In the words of Reed and Harvey (1992), we need a science
that
treats nature and society as if they were ontologically open and
historically constituted; hierarchically structured, yet interactively
complex; non-reductive and indeterminate, yet amenable to rational
explanation; capable of seeing nature as a “self-organizing” enter-
prise without succumbing to anthropomorphism or mystifying ani-
mism.
No formal approach will in itself be enough to capture societal systems (Byrne
and Callaghan, 2013), or as Cilliers (2002) puts it, the study of what we call
wickedness “is not going to introduce us to a brave new world in which we will
be able to control our destiny; it confronts us with the limits of human under-
standing.” However, while the poor decomposability of wicked systems does not
have postmodernist implications for whether we should do science, it does have
carry significant implications for how we should do science. We know systems
by defining them in terms of boundaries, but while these demarcations can be
done in many ways, suggesting different framings of the same system, reality
does have a saying in how they are made. This perspective accepts neither posi-
tivism nor relativism: it recognizes that our descriptions are social constructions,
but also that these constructions are shaped by reality.
This disaffirms the current approach of complexity science in societal sys-
tems, which, as argued by Byrne and Callaghan (2013), has so far attempted to
develop a positivist inquiry in qualitative social science that somehow encapsu-
lates the complexity into formalisms, which Cilliers (2001) convincingly argues
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is impossible. Instead, a more constructive venue is argued to lie in the develop-
ment of an exploratory and interpretative approach bridging the methodological
gap between the quantitative and the qualitative. Essentially, we want to make
structure part of the process, and have a methodology and ontology that allows
for nested but interpenetrating systems with causal powers running in all direc-
tions.
While formal methods may have limited place in the study of wicked systems,
bridging the quantitative-qualitative divide of course means significant method-
ological development. The rise of information and communication technology
has produced an unprecedented wealth of qualitative data that provide rich, lon-
gitudinal detail about social relationships as they unfold. This potential of this
data for social research has however remained relatively unharnessed, largely
due to a divide between methodological development and social theory (Bail,
2014). While computer scientists have developed powerful new tools for au-
tomated analysis of such data, they lack the theoretical direction necessary to
extract meaning. What is needed are new tools informed by social theory for
studying social interaction and tracing the evolution of cultural elements over
time. The type of approach to empirical data that this represents is in many ways
reminiscent of simulation models applied by complexity scientists, in that they
offer great flexibility, but bring with them certain rigor. Those tools however, as
Hedström (2005) argues, are rarely at all connected to empirical data. Hedström
refers to such models as fictions, and argues that models that do not engage with
data have no connection to reality from which their isomorphism and validity
can be assessed; they have no mode of calibration (Hedström and Åberg, 2005).
Solving this central issue, bringing the mix of flexibility and rigor characteristic
of simulation models to the analysis of empirical data, promises great potential:
it allows us to stay close to empirical data, while at the same time not making
assumptions of fixed ontology. It adds empirical rigor to qualitative descriptions,
without giving way to formalities, or locking ourselves up to inflexible ontolo-
gies.
In short we conclude that an approach on wicked systems should: (i) focus on
synthesis and the development of a post-disciplinary science of wicked systems;
(ii) approach systems from the inside, rather than the outside; (iii) be explicit
in normative issues; (iv) approach empirical data in a way that addresses the
quantitative-qualitative divide.
It is with these heuristics in mind that we in the next part approach societal
change.
Chapter4
Innovation in Wicked Systems
The idea that change in natural and social systems is governed by homological
principles is old and has long been an impetus for transferring ideas developed
in evolutionary biology to the study of social systems. In the context of innova-
tion we have most importantly the revitalization of evolutionary economics with
“An evolutionary theory of economic change” by Nelson and Winter (1982), but
also the not too dissimilar Dual-Inheritance Theory (see Mesoudi, 2011, for a
review) in anthropology following Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd
and Richerson (1985). Other such traditions include “memetics” which devel-
oped as an area of study following a suggestion by Dawkins (2006) and evolu-
tionary epistemology (Campbell, 1965, 1974). This influence can be clearly seen
in many of the terms and concepts used in technological innovation research, such
as niches, evolutionary trajectories, fitness landscapes and so on. The methodol-
ogy by which this idea has mainly been pursued is focused on agent-based simu-
lation, and to some extent on population genetic models in evolutionary biology
(that connection is even stronger in the related Dual-Inheritance Theory in an-
thropology; e.g. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985).
Since the time when these influences were developed, evolutionary biology
has undergone dramatic change, which has however not been reflected in how we
look at social systems. Evolutionary thinking in the social sciences largely re-
mains true to an older neo-Darwinian1 conception of evolution. This framework
rests strongly on population thinking (e.g. Mayr 1993) which in neo-Darwinism
1The theoretical foundation of evolutionary biology formed in the “Modern Synthesis” ( 1930-
1950). The basic formal toolbox of neo-Darwinian theory has deeply shaped our intuition for
evolutionary systems even when its formal models are not directly used.
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came to be isolated as the real center piece of Darwinian thinking, modeling and
explanation. Models are here formulated on a microscopic level of genes and
traits and where the shaping forces are external to the evolving system itself and
the logic of evolution is close to that of optimization. Counterparts in the social
sciences then implement these models based on entities such as ideas, technolo-
gies and memes, sorted by selection pressures. The logic of populations with
variation undergoing external selection remains a cornerstone also here. This
type of methodology, with a set of nodes interacting in a fixed environment, is
easily recognized as belonging to a modeling tradition based on assumptions of
decomposability and clear scale separation. The question is to what degree such
assumptions hold for this type of systems.
Over the past twenty years or so evolutionary biology has departed from the
neo-Darwinian paradigm in important ways. While many of the elements of this
recent “Extended Synthesis” (Pigliucci et al., 2010)2 are older, the decisive fac-
tor in their recent strong ascent is a dramatically improved empirical picture of
the material basis of the mechanisms that underpin evolution. A similar increase
in data-availability is happening in the social sciences, but so far without corre-
sponding impact on theory. The past two-three decades have seen an accelerating
technology-driven development of techniques for empirical data gathering, anal-
ysis and storage. This has led to dramatically improved empirical availability in
the social sciences and humanities. Old and cherished theories, models and views
have in many cases proven to be unable to accommodate these new empirical pic-
tures, and thus found themselves under substantial pressure.
In fact, this development is importantly impacting our notions of what terms
like novelty and innovation mean. In biology, novelty used to be equated with
genetic mutations with a subsequent and separate phase of spread, which is un-
derstood as a population genetic process. In the social sciences novelty was basi-
cally invention with a subsequent phase of rational adoption and spread - a passive
“diffusion” process - understood using models that are similar (or even identical)
to those used in biology. Older theories tend to black-box the mechanisms that
are at play in the studied system - in other words they attempt to make do without
data that used to be hard or impossible to obtain. Older theory also imposes strict
scale separations, thus taming the wickedness of the system and allowing theory
construction to be focused on separate subsystems, typically on a privileged level
2Including e.g. Evolutionary Developmental Biology (Arthur, 2011), Developmental Systems
Theory (Oyama et al., 2003) and Niche Construction Theory (Odling-Smee et al., 2003). We use
“Evolutionary Developmental” as an umbrella term for the systemic Darwinian approaches that
have grown strongly in the wake of a greatly improved empirical understanding of how genotypes
and phenotypes are really linked.
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of organization. This led to theory that was workable under the technological and
empirical conditions that existed, and that moreover shaped the very notion of
what proper science really ought to be.
Today we see these black boxes coming ajar, and we see the interfaces be-
tween those separated subsystems - by now often marking the separation between
entire disciplines - coming into view. This reveals many basic theoretical assump-
tions and models as misguided in highly consequential ways. One example is the
concept of “adaptation” which is seen as a process of constrained optimization
with regard to a timeless and external environment. As these subdivisions - e.g.
system and environment - are challenged, terms such as adaptation come to take
on new meanings. Such assumptions and separations have not only been built into
the theories, but also into empirical models and methods, separating qualitative
and quantitative change. They are also clearly at odds with an increasing pres-
sure in many disciplines concerned with innovation for a move toward increased
realism.
What this certainly points to is a methodological challenge, as of yet far from
resolved: how do we deal with multi-level complex adaptive systems where orga-
nization scaffolds the dynamics that generates it? Methods based on incorrectly
assuming decomposability and hoping for the best seem to increasingly have
played out their role, but new ideas are simultaneously developing in a range
of disciplines facing similar problems related to wicked systems. We believe that
connecting and uniting these threads may contribute to a more coherent picture
of how such systems can be approached.
4.1 A Synthetic Approach to Innovation
We will here briefly introduce our highly tentative synthetic approach to innova-
tion in wicked systems. The main ingredients in this synthesis are:
• Technical change theory (theories such as Multi-Level Perspective, Strate-
gic Niche Management, Transition Management, Social Construction of
Technology, etc. and authors like Geels, Hughes, Schumpeter and many
more)
• Exaptive bootstrapping and the theories associated to Lane et al (2009).
• Social movement theory.
• Evolutionary developmental biology (most notably Niche Construction The-
ory and Generative Entrenchment, that are explicitly represented.)
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Our understanding of innovation is somewhat broader than how it is usually
interpreted in the context of technical change: we focus not only on a contempo-
rary context of technological development, but include earlier cultural evolution,
with the goal of understanding the rise of the current sociotechnical organization.
This allows us to study the development and transformations that lead to the de-
velopment of the current societal organization. Furthermore, our understanding
of innovation also includes the academically separate, but theoretically adjacent
study of change instigated by social movements. It is clear that social move-
ments and proponents of radical path-breaking technical innovations are under
very similar challenges: they are centered on developing narratives that compete
and diffuse in society, and they are up against existing normative and institutional
configurations, that affect how their innovations are perceived and received. En-
trepreneurs trying to push a radical path-breaking innovation are in many ways
similar to activists trying to push for institutional change. They both develop in
protected social spaces, until they are developed enough to take on the same inter-
connected and rigid incumbent structures. They both need to build up legitimacy
and gather momentum, build networks and connect with influential actors. Such
an innovation might be anything from a new story about how we can understand
society or just a new physical artifact - in any case it will be dependent and con-
nected with existing institutions, narratives and technologies. In both cases, its
backers need to build up networks of contacts, build legitimacy, and spread their
constantly transforming innovation. This motivates exploring common ground in
theory and attempting synthesizing certain perspective (as exemplified by Paper
III).
We begin by introducing what we refer to as exaptive bootstrapping. This
theory was developed as part of the INSITE project, having the ISCOM project
as its starting point (see Lane et al. 2009). As it provides motivation for and is
foundational to the synthetic theory development, we will explore this in more
detail.
4.2 Exaptive Bootstrapping and the Innovation Society
The Innovation Society is, on the most abstract level, a society where innovation
is no longer just a means of solving problems: a society where innovation is
ideologically sublimated and has become entrenched at the very heart of how
society functions - where innovation becomes important in itself quite regardless
of what gets innovated. On a more specific level, we use the term to denote the
particular combination of ideology and physical infrastructure that incarnates our
30 CHAPTER 4. INNOVATION IN WICKED SYSTEMS
Innovation Society today.
The basis for the Innovation Society and its ideology is the potential for in-
novation to become reified as a goal in its own right, and subsequently subjected
to itself with the aim of improving its own function. Innovation has become a
project for innovation itself. As a natural phenomenon this is an entirely new
thing - it is unique to human culture. But it is not an essential feature of human
culture - it has not always been that way. The idea that we can improve society
and our own quality of life by innovation is characteristic of the Enlightenment
and signifies a drastic shift in ideology: from the view that we ought to preserve
a God-given social order to the view that that we ought to use science (in a broad
sense) to understand the world and master it so as to increase our wellbeing.
There are of course several sub-ideologies that propose different ways of orga-
nizing innovation to achieve such improvements in well-being - most importantly
based on either bottom-up self-organization or top-down management. Neither
has proven itself to be potent as solutions to the sustainability problems that we
face today.
To understand the Innovation Society, we will have to look further into the
relation between artifacts and human culture.
The introduction of new artifacts necessarily involves changes in new pat-
terns of interaction among people, not only through the use of the artifacts, but
also through, for example, their production, marketing and maintenance. There
is an inextricable linkage between the introduction of new artifacts into a society
and transformations in the social relations and organization of that society. As
people’s living conditions and social relations transform around the presence of
the artifact, they may become incompatible with the institutional and organiza-
tional structures of the old. Structures that used to facilitate become deadweight.
This is a point of conflict, where new organization may replace the old, where
agency can play an important role, as the developing structures have not yet be-
come entrenched.
For example, the introduction of a new software system in a business firm will
affect how work is organized: the new technology is never fully aligned with the
old way of doing things. The effects may be superficial or profound: it might just
mean a different way of filing or it might mean that the whole floor of secretaries
will become superfluous. A similar type of dynamics between technology and so-
cial organization applies on all levels of society. A society’s institutions emerge
in interaction with the artifacts and the technology of that society, through highly
unpredictable feedback processes: on the small scale, a new office computer sys-
tem may result in new company work processes; on a large scale, the hand-mill
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co-evolved into a society with feudal lords, and the steam mill into a society
with industrial capitalists. The institutions that form around technologies need
to be in a sense compatible with the technology with which they interact: when
institutions become misaligned with the artifacts underlying them, instabilities
occur, creating the opportunity for social and technological change. As the rapid
progress of artifact innovation continues, such societal instabilities are continu-
ally sparked on all levels of society. Societal structures effective in harnessing the
possibilities of available artifacts gradually turn into shackles as the artifacts con-
tinue to evolve. The breakdown of structure leads to an ’era of ferment’, where
a set of alternatives are competing openly for the development of new structures
co-evolving with the development of new technology.
Such feedback process of co-evolution results in unpredictable social and
technological transformation, making it highly difficult to achieve intended so-
cial effects through technological development. But such technological change is
in any case the exception: artifacts are generally not evaluated on the basis of the
transformative effects they will have on societal structure, they are solely evalu-
ated for their perceived benefits for the individual agent that decides whether to
purchase it. The impact on social relations is here an unintended consequence.
It is this type of atomistically individualist evaluation processes that decides the
value of new artifacts; it is the what we refer to when we say the market - a cen-
tral actor in our current innovation society. Atomistic rationality has taken over a
larger and larger part of what used to be part of the realm of political decisions,
while politics is increasingly left to priming the pump of innovation. Progress is
seen as inevitable, whatever it may entail (Ellul, 1967).
The stability of this system is based on competition on all levels. Compe-
tition out-crowds everything but more innovation. Any attempts to subordinate
innovation to other values, like cultural enrichment or social justice, are made im-
possible by competition at the level of individuals, firms and national economies.
Competition dooms any potential Samaritans to failure, which at the national
level - which ostensibly has some level of political play - would translate into
economic decline and social chaos. This in practice undermines any attempt at
going against the stream, except on the global level where necessary organiza-
tional structures are largely lacking.
As we have seen, the causal arrows between innovation and organizational
transformation go both ways: new innovations change our organizations, and
changing organization affects what artifacts are produced. This means that a
feedback dynamic is present (Lane, 2011). We have the formation of innovation
cascades, linking the generation of new artifact types, organizational transforma-
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tions and new attributions of functionality. According to Lane et al. (2009), the
positive feedback dynamic works as follows:
1. New artifact types are designed to achieve some particular attribution of
functionality.
2. Organizational transformations are constructed to proliferate the use of to-
kens of the new type.
3. Novel patterns of human interaction emerge around these artifacts in use.
4. New attributions of functionality are generated - by participants or ob-
servers - to describe what the participants in these interactions are obtaining
or might obtain from them.
5. New artifacts are conceived and designed to instantiate the new attributed
functionality.
As the negative side effects of these innovations are neither expected nor eval-
uated for, they accumulate over time, resulting in crisis (Sveiby et al., 2009). How
does society respond to these crises? Because of the limitations set by competi-
tion, political decisions are mainly limited to attempting to steer and encourage
the right type of innovations - but the dynamics of unpredictable cascades makes
this type of control highly precarious. In a process that seems to perhaps exem-
plify what Hegel called the irony of history, even the most well meaning attempt
at solving a crisis tends to sooner or later generate a new crisis. But for a soci-
ety based on market-based decision-making through innovation, this is the only
solution available. The market responds to opportunities to remediate the conse-
quences that innovation cascades may generate, but it is becoming increasingly
difficult to ignore that the market is not very efficient at this. This again relates
to the dynamics of market decisions and its constant guiding light of economic
value. What is worse, as these suggested solutions are not evaluated with regards
to resilience or sustainability, they often take the form of going from the frying
pan to the fire: like the alcoholic curing a hangover, society tries to solve its
problems by applying more of what caused the problems.
An illustrating example of this is the current obesity epidemic in large parts
of the western world. Technological innovations in agriculture, mainly in the
form of using finite resources to replace labor and access to soil, produced a
surplus of cheap calories. To increase returns, these products were increasingly
processed in a co-evolution with changing patterns of consumption, which in turn
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interacted with changing values in society. The detrimental health effects of the
set of western food that evolved from this are well-documented (see e.g Pollan,
2008). But the market’s response to these issues were not to stop marketing of
products that are clearly unfit for human consumption, but rather to take (the
more profitable) route of technological development in primarily the diet and
pharmaceutical industries. While these have been enormously profitable, they
have also had basically no effect on the obesity epidemic.
The central role of innovation in contemporary society means that the pro-
cesses of changing institutions occur much more swiftly today. Creative destruc-
tion is more and more swiftly accepted, as other values than value are less and
less valued.
Lane et al. (2011) summarizes the Innovation Society and its ideology as
follows:
Our society’s dependence on innovation cascades is expressed
in, and sustained by, an increasingly widespread way of thinking,
which we will term the Innovation Society ideology. This ideol-
ogy underlies almost all current discourse about business strategy
and governmental policy. The following four propositions form its
central core: (1) the principal aim of policy is sustained economic
growth, interpreted as a steady increase in GDP; (2) the engine of
this growth is innovation, interpreted as the creation of new kinds of
artifacts; (3) Which new kinds of artifacts have value is decided by
the market; (4) the price to pay for not innovating, or for subordi-
nating innovation to other values, like cultural enrichment or social
justice is prohibitively high: competition, at the level of firms and of
national economies, dooms dawdlers to failure, which translates into
economic decline and social chaos.
4.3 Niche Construction Theory
Niche-Construction Theory challenges the idea that “organisms adapt to their en-
vironment, never vice versa” (Williams, 1992) by emphasizing how organisms
affect their environment (Odling-Smee et al., 2003). Any organism living and
interacting with an environment will naturally affect its surroundings: it absorbs
energy and resources and emits detritus; it constructs artifacts and finally dies,
and through such actions modifies at least parts of the environment. Such modifi-
cations will naturally become part of the natural selection pressure of organisms
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living in the environment, including the organism that initiated the modifications.
In this sense, organisms are influencing their own evolution by creating the con-
ditions of that evolution. Odling-Smee (1988) introduced the term niche con-
struction for this phenomenon, observing that it has wide implications for evolu-
tionary theory since it profoundly transforms the conception of natural selection:
the perspective changes to viewing evolutionary change as “reciprocally caused”
(Laland et al., 2011). The process is furthermore very general, to the extent that
it is exhibited by all living organisms (Odling-Smee et al., 2003). Despite of
this, the field has only quite recently become an area of study within evolutionary
theory (Laland and Brown, 2006).
Much of the importance of the niche construction concept emanates from the
fact that it replaces a simple adaptation perspective with a framework focusing on
co-evolution between organism and environment, where feedback and interaction
takes the center stage. There are many evolutionary effects like these that niche
construction can result in, many of which have been uncovered through model-
ing or mathematical analysis. Some of these dynamics include momentum effects
(continued evolution despite that the selection has stopped or reversed), the gen-
eration of time lags in response to selection, inertia effects (no evolution despite
selection pressure), exacerbation or amelioration of competition, affecting co-
evolution and the likelihood of coexistance, opposite responses to selection, and
sudden catastrophic responses to selection. (Krakauer et al., 2009; Kylafis and
Loreau, 2011; Laland et al., 1996, 2001; Robertson, 1991). (See Laland et al.
2014 and the references given therein for a more thorough listing of the effects
on evolutionary dynamics.)
Niche Construction Theory implies a very concrete challenge of the treat-
ment of natural evolution as a decomposable system, both in modeling and in the
scientific organization. Population genetic models typically view evolution as an
adaptation to a fixed environment that is external to the process, and based on sim-
ilar assumptions the study of biology is subdivided into disciplines, for example
treating ecology and evolution as two separate subjects. As Niche Construction
Theory shows, this is based on problematic assumptions about evolution: it treats
a wicked system as decomposable.
Niche Construction Theory is a highly general idea, and as a general idea it
is perhaps not as new as its biological incarnation: similar ideas have long been
pursued in the social sciences. But on the other hand, this congruency also opens
up paths for cross-disciplinary learning about such processes. Niche Construc-
tion Theory has been applied in the context of cultural evolution (e.g. Laland
and O’Brien, 2011; Laland et al., 2001), but the focus has been on the effect of
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culture as a constructed niche on biology. While this is of great interest, Niche
Construction is also useful as a perspective on cultural dynamics itself: the same
delineation problem that applies between organism and environment applies also
between culture and environment.
4.4 Generative Entrenchment
Intuitively, Generative Entrenchment can be understood from the simple fact that
“trying to rebuild foundations after we have already constructed an edifice upon
them is demanding and dangerous work” (Wimsatt, 1999), or put more gener-
ally: more entrenched system elements tend to be more evolutionarily conserva-
tive (Rasmussen, 1987; Wimsatt, 1986). Change in a component that underlies
other components results in changes also higher up in the structure, causing a
cascade of changes. The change in the underlying component must be evaluated
not only with regard to the change itself, but also to the net effects of all cas-
cading changes, and these must be beneficial for the change to be adaptive. In
other words, the further down in the foundation the element is, the higher the risk
that changes will cause irreparable damage to higher-level structures. However
simple, this fact has large consequences on the system dynamics and represents
an important generator of complex organization (Wimsatt, 2013).
Let us clarify this using individual learning as an example. We acquire cul-
ture in a process of enculturation, which exhibits an entangled mixture between
cultural and physiological development: through physiological development in
our cognitive skills including speech and motor skills, through training and men-
toring in our more culturally specific skills. Developmental dependencies affect
essentially all of our skills, including writing, reading, mathematical skills, and
the various subject matters we learn in school, as well as in our social skills, and
the various practical skills from riding a bike to using complex tools. Entrench-
ment here is the process through which the earlier skills that we acquire are built
upon and presupposed in acquiring the later skills, for which the earlier skills be-
come essential. This hierarchical organization of knowledge is highly economic
as it re-uses learned elements and minimizes the number of elements that we will
need to learn. It also makes learning more robust and flexible. The most general
and basic knowledge is learned first (e.g. the alphabet, writing, simple arithmetics
and so on) and for each step we take in the learning process new doors are opened
up since what we have learned will allow us to learn new and more derived things.
With such a hierarchical arrangement of knowledge we also do not have to retrace
all the way to the bottom if we want to learn something else; we just retrace to
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an earlier intermediate point and chose another direction from there (e.g. at the
level of college studies). But the flexibility that we gain by this arrangement is
not perfect of course: the hierarchical organization enables and constrains our
options. The constraining effect of the most basic levels is actually probably so
strong that we even have problems imagining what sort of things that would have
been possible if they were different. This includes not only tools such as writing
and mathematics but also basic notions of what is valuable, virtuous and bad. We
may certainly “think outside of the box”, but the further down the hierarchy we
go the harder it gets, and indeed the more unpredictable the outcomes if we really
do it.
In this way, entrenchment constitutes a fundamental link between structure
and dynamics of evolutionary systems, showing how structure limits, scaffolds
and transforms change. Interesting dynamic phenomena, such as stasis and rapid
transformation, adaptability and hierarchical structures, are interlinked through
entrenchment. Entrenchment is fundamentally the reason why history matters,
since the order of evolution of elements will often be reflected in the structure
of these dependencies. Structure limits adaptation; stasis is adaptation limited by
structure; rapid change is cascades of structural transformation.
4.5 Transition Theory and Technical Change
The multi-level perspective focuses on sociotechnical transitions, and on what
conditions need to apply for fundamental transitions to take place (see Geels,
2002, 2011; Geels and Schot, 2007; Markard et al., 2012). This theory dis-
tinguishes three analytical levels: niches, socio-technical regimes and exoge-
nous socio-technical landscapes. Niches constitute the micro level where radi-
cal innovations are generated and grow. They provide protective spaces for new
path-breaking radical alternative technologies to protect them from the normal
selection environment. Regimes consist of rules in the form of the prevailing
norms, values, technologies, standards and infrastructure embedded in the ele-
ments within the socio-technical regime. These rules guide the involved actors
and tend to limit patterns of behavior and lead to lock-in and path-dependency for
technological development. Hence, socio-technical regimes are functionally sim-
ilar to what Kuhn (1962) called paradigms, as their function is to ”create stability
and guide innovative activity towards incremental improvements along trajecto-
ries” (Geels, 2002). The socio-technical landscape refers to the wider macro-level
technology-external context that includes both material and social factors, form-
ing a context and deep structural trends for both the regime and niches.
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Together, these analytically separated levels constitute a socio-technical sys-
tem and socio-technical transitions are understood as regime changes, which are
the result of multi-dimensional processes and interactions within and between
these levels. In short, Geels and Schot (2007) describe the relation between the
different levels as a nested hierarchy, meaning that the socio-technical regimes
are embedded within landscapes and niches within regimes. These components
and sub-systems depend on each other, and this interdependency functions as an
obstacle for the emergence of new technology (Geels, 2004). Hence, this ba-
sic structure tends to lead to changes within the regime being incremental and
path-dependent, leading to lock-in processes. While some new innovations are
well-adapted and can be incorporated within the system, others are not compati-
ble with the existing regime and therefore have difficulties breaking through.
The key-point of this framework is that technical transitions occur when the
interplay and linkages within and between dynamics at the different levels be-
come connected, link up and reinforce each other. A necessary condition for
radical technical transitions to occur is the combination of the rise of a strong
socio-technical alternative fostered in niches together with an opening in the se-
lection environment within the socio-technical regime. If tensions build up in
the existing regime level, this results in cracks or windows of opportunity, which
possibly enable breakthroughs of new radical novelties (Geels, 2006b).
These processes can lead to the emergence of unexpected and unforesee-
able consequences, such as when the breakthrough of a specific artifact, or small
changes in the landscape or regime level, lead to a cascade of new innovations,
due to processes linking up and reinforcing each other. This means that changes
in one element of the network can trigger changes in another element and even
lead to radical transformation in the entire structure. Under certain circumstances,
a wealth of innovations can grow in niches under the surface, unable to break
through since the regime is stable. In these cases, a small crack can lead to ”an
era of ferment” when these hidden innovations manage to ”hit the surface”. Other
well-known phenomena within socio-technical systems are the above-mentioned
lock-in processes and path-dependency, which are central notions relevant to un-
derstand the stability and dynamic rigidity (Geels, 2004) in socio-technical sys-
tems as well as the difficulty to change established regimes.
Following this, transitions cannot be explained by constant-cause explana-
tions (Geels and Schot, 2007). The co-evolution approach on which the multi-
level perspective is based focuses on evolutionary causality or “circular causal-
ity” (Geels, 2005), meaning that multiple dynamics within and between elements
of socio-technical systems interact in feedback-loops; they co-evolve. “The co-
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construction process of new innovations is non-linear and uncertain” (Geels,
2006a) and “consists of multiple dynamics, interactions, co-evolution, feedback,
seamless webs and emerging linkages between heterogeneous elements” (Geels,
2004). Hereby, multi-level perspective moves focus from simple causality in tran-
sitions and system innovations. There is no simple ’cause’ or ’driver’ but rather
“processes at multiple dimensions and levels simultaneously” and transitions oc-
cur “when these processes link up and reinforce each other” (Geels, 2005).
Sociotechnical regimes in turn fit into larger structures of interconnected so-
ciotechnical systems, which Grübler (2003) refers to as technical clusters. There
is in this way in a sense a self-similarity in the network structure: dense areas in
the network can in turn be seen as nodes of a higher-level network. Parts of the
cultural machinery that are more entrenched than others form a tightly knit core
of the cultural system. The collapse of such large-scale technical clusters is one
way of seeing important societal transition, such as the transition to industrial-
ism. The core technologies of the system are changed, and the new developing
technologies and institutional structures are designed around this new core. Such
transitions bring with them fundamental institutional changes, such as new ways
of organizing labor, as was clearly the case in relation to industrialism.
New sociotechnical systems can develop into stable regimes as part of a pre-
vious technical paradigm, simply by being competitive despite lack of support
from a coherent technical cluster. They can through this contribute to forming
scaffolding structures, facilitating the development of other technologies, con-
stituting the seed of a new cluster - in a feedback process that can result in a
rapid large-scale transition. Such interdependencies and amplifying phenomena
between sociotechnical systems can be strongly non-linear and are in general
highly difficult to anticipate.
4.6 Returning to the Innovation Society
Let us now turn this framework toward the system that motivated its development.
The Innovation Society does not really break with old traditions as much as one
may think when it comes to the fundamental dynamics of innovation. Basically
the same mechanisms of innovation are at play. But it does do something highly
powerful and peculiar from a natural historical point of view. In the innovation
society, the natural growth has in a deep sense turned cancerous: it is no longer
motivated, controlled or limited by needs, but has become a goal in itself. In-
novation is no longer simply a process that emerges as we exercise our cultural
strategies - but has become something that we consciously pursue, ideologically
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look upon as virtuous, and that we have become dependent upon.
This positive feedback innovation dynamics have become ever more impor-
tant in the organization and ideology of our society. Just like species collectively
constructing a functional biotope adapted for biological life, our society has be-
come formed into a perfect habitat for the development and marketing of new
artifacts. Through a set of evolving organizational forms - such as organizations
for design and engineering of new innovations, as well as the adverting and mar-
keting industry identifying and creating new demand - the cycle of innovation has
sped up. The cascades of change running through society - through its foilage
rather than its trunks - are because of this larger and more frequent.
The structures and forms of organization that this niche of perpetual artifact
production has resulted in have themselves become further and further entrenched
in society, to an extent that the innovation engine today itself is rooted into the
core of the sociotechnical cluster that constitutes our society. It has formed a
regime that has become necessary for the functioning and stability of the so-
ciotechnical system itself. While we have become dependent on this core, it pro-
vides a rather paradoxical stability: we have become locked-in to state of constant
explosive change. Our blind pursuit of change and novelty means that society is
exposed to the danger of being undermined by the mass of unforeseen side effects
that we cannot avoid due to ontological uncertainty (Lane and Maxfield, 2005).
This constant innovation - without aim or goals; without any continuous
evaluation; without social considerations; without contact with the resources on
which it depends - will inherently lead to crises. These are endogenous to our way
of organizing innovation processes: a system based on competition in innovation
and marketing efficiency will naturally be unable to develop long-term resilience
and sustainability (c.f. Tainter, 1990). As our society becomes more efficient, it
also becomes less resilient, as it become more interlinked and interdependent, the
crises become increasingly large-scale (Helbing, 2013).
If the meta-crisis is indeed endogenous to our societal organization (Lane
et al., 2009), the available societal control mechanisms seem inadequate to pro-
vide a necessary response. To the extent that policymaking is supported by sci-
ence at all, it preferentially relies on the type of formal quantitative models epit-
omized by neoclassical economic theory, which notably places primacy on the
microlevel and on economic value as the prime mover of society. But in the wake
of this meta-crisis, which has neither been predicted nor hindered by our current
understanding, there is a widespread sentiment that we must bring about a type
of societal change that is outside the scope of this type of models, such as broad-
ening the range of factors that affect the direction of society: from a primacy of
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economic values to the inclusion of also societal and environmental values; from
a reductionist and economic-value-centered view to a more holistic and inclusive
one.
Innovation is by definition needed to solve the metacrisis, but at the same
time, it is also what caused the crisis - innovation as constituted by our current
processes of innovation. The necessary innovations and social transformations
needed to solve the metacrisis is unlikely to be generated by the same structures
that caused it.
An alternative regime for innovation is thus needed. But as we have seen,
there appears to be no off-the-shelf approaches for organizing innovation in ways
that lead to a sustainable path into the future. The meta-perspective of viewing
the structures and processes of innovation as regimes - constructing niches and
themselves becoming entrenched - was useful to understanding the problems we
face, and can perhaps be similarly useful in finding a solution to them. New forms
of innovation and production, unattached to the structures of the current regime
of innovation and instead belonging to a new cluster of societal organization, can
contribute to the formation of scaffolding structures facilitating the development
of additional new forms of organization. Communication technology are cen-
tral in the development of such processes, as they constitute an unprecedentedly
versatile tool for creating scaffolding structures for new forms of decentralized
collaboration - a central foundation for the development of new innovation pro-
cesses.
For such processes to develop, we need to find protected spaces outside both
conventional politics and the market, where such alternative processes can grow,
shielded from the existing regime of innovation. Once developed, such inno-
vative forms of processes can lead to a bootstrapping process, forming a new
framework for the organization of innovation processes, allowing for new forms
of evaluation and participation. Such processes can happen as fast as fast as they
are unpredictable - with change on the fringe quickly bootstrapping into profound
societal transformation.
Finding spaces and community for alternatives to grow does not have to mean
moving to an anarchistic village. But it does mean finding new stories, outside
dreams of new kitchens. Stories focused on building the new; able to conjure new
spectres, to haunt the dreams of the old.
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